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HINGES, DEEP DISAGREEMENT AND FIXED POINTS
IN THE ARGUMENTATION LOGIC2
Abstract. In his treatise ‘On Certainty’ (1969) L. Wittgenstein compared the propositions ex-
pressing basic principles to the hinges enabling both doubting and justifying knowledge. In 1985
Robert Fogelin proposed the conception of deep disagreement in argumentation analysis and
in his description of it he referred to the hinges. We continue Wittgenstein’s hinges metaphor
and compare pulling and pushing the door of knowledge to adopting contrary standings about
principal issues, which can result in the deep disagreements. We suggest looking at the hinges
enabling those door moves as at the fixed points in the extension semantic of the argumen-
tation logic. Interpreting the hinges as the fixed points allows viewing rejected arguments as
isolated deadlocks of the deep disagreements, or anti-extensions, and opens a possibility for a
compromise on the basis of certain extensions.
Keywords: argument, abstract argumentation framework, extension semantic, Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, Robert Fogelin.
Аннотация. В трактате «О достоверности» (1969) Л. Витгенштейн сравнил предложения,
выражающие ключевые принципы знаний людей, с дверными петлями, без которых невоз-
можно ни обосновывать знание, ни сомневаться в нём. В 1985 году Роберт Фогелин предло-
жил понятие глубокого несогласия для анализа аргументации и, описывая его свойства, со-
слался на дверные петли Витгенштейна. Если продолжить метафору дверных петель Вит-
генштейна, то, если дверь познания толкают или тянут, это ведет к глубоким разногласиям
по принципиальным вопросам. В русле этого мы предлагаем посмотреть на дверные петли
как на неподвижные точки в семантике расширения логики аргументации. Это позволяет
рассматривать отклоненные аргументы как изолированные тупики глубоких разногласий
и открывает возможность для компромисса на основе определённых расширений.
Ключевые слова: аргумент, абстрактные структуры аргументации, семантика расширений,
Людвиг Витгенштейн, Роберт Фогелин.
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The conception of deep disagreements which ‘cannot be resolved through the use of
argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing’ (Fogelin 2005: 7–8)
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was proposed by Robert Fogelin in 1985 as a development of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
idea that ‘the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn’
(Wittgenstein 1969: 341). Among the sources of deep disagreements are moral and
political views, routine rules of social life and reasoning and lack of knowledge when
the science is silent or gives ambivalent answers to our questions.
Fogelin illustrates the deep disagreements with two examples. The first is the abor-
tion dispute which refers to the issue of when exactly the human soul is born, prior to
baby’s birth, or shortly after that. The pro-lifers justify their anti-abortion claim by
referring to the former which confronts the latter held by the pro-choicers. Another Fo-
gelin’s example is a political stand-off about positive discrimination. Opposing parties
agree that it is good practice, but disagree on its procedure. Should it be endorsed as a
mechanism for making the chances for better life equal for people raising from unequal
households, which risks privileging less competent, or as a mechanism for protecting
the members of a certain group, from which may benefit those who were never really
discriminated? The first example is about an epistemic deep disagreement rooted in
our ignorance, although it is often presented as a moral stand-off. The other one ap-
pears a cognitive disagreement about why we may need the positive discrimination,
but in fact it is a disagreement the routine of social practice. Because of the parties’
disagreement about what that practice should amount to they are likely to bury such
a bill, if it were put on vote. This shows that although the deep disagreement has a
local character it still endangers a consensus about an issue.
Wittgenstein described the hinges as the propositions expressing key principles pre-
ferred by rational agents, which have the following two properties:
(i) they are non-factual propositions expressing agents’ preferences, and not their
beliefs about situations, which makes the preferences as shaky as the reasons
proposed in support of them,
(ii) at least one dispute party refers to her preference as commonly shared and ‘de-
clares the other a fool and heretic’ (Wittgenstein 1969: 611) for disbelieving it.
Property (ii) often show up in the ad hominem and common-sense arguments used
by one party for refuting not only the contrary claim but the person of the other
party as well. The ad hominem and common-sense arguments belong to the plausible,
or presumptive, arguments which are non-demonstrative. They can be sound or not
depending on the course of dispute where they are used (Walton 1996). While in one
dialogue the plausible arguments can provide a support for its conclusion yet in another
dialogue they can be fallacious. The personal attack conveyed by (ii) marks out the
deep disagreement in either way.
Property (i) gave rise to the so-called hinges epistemology (Ranalli 2020) with its key
issue of whether the hinges are propositions held either true or false by the confronting
parties (Kusch 2016; Coliva 2015), they are rules for proofs and discussions (McGinn
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1989; Moyal-Sharrock 2005) or they are neither of them (Wright 2014; Pritchard 2016).
The propositional view treats the hinges as conceptual disagreements in the epistemic
sense, similar to that in the abortion example, whereas the rules-related view turns the
disagreements into the cognitive diversity which can be viewed as the logical diversity,
too (Лисанюк, Павлова 2016). The propositional and rule-related view of the hinges
relate them to the widely held conception of knowledge as justified true belief with the
verification as its key tool for distinguishing propositions expressing true knowledge
from those which are not so.
The third position generated a variety of the hinges interpretations to which belongs
Fogelin’s idea that that they express ‘moral standing’. He proposed another pair of
properties of the deep disagreement (Fogelin 2005: 10–11):
(iii) the parties ‘can agree on all historical and statistical issues, but still disagree’,
(iv) the deep disagreement cannot be resolved by conviction but can be—by persua-
sion.
Proposed in (iv) persuasive ways of dispute disagreement allow employing the non-
demonstrative reasoning, if the demonstrative one fails. Non-demonstrative reasoning
imply the idea of knowledge as defeasible and falsifiable, according to which a true
proposition once justified and regarded knowledge can be disregarded later. Conse-
quently, a rational agent believes in propositions she can justify rather by defending
them with arguments against the counterarguments in favor of the contrary proposi-
tion than by verifying them by means of inferring them out of some other propositions
(Pollock 2010).
(i) and (ii) suggest that whatever is the issue of the disagreement it leads into a
deadlock the parties engaged in it, since the shared reliance for its resolution is empty.
(iii) points to a way for the parties’ compromise by isolating the dispute deadlocks
labelled by the rejected arguments and focusing on the subsets of arguments proved
acceptable.
The concept of (defeasibly) acceptable argument is central in the argumentation
logic, a new branch of logic for studying argumentation, which emerged at the cross-
road of AI, argumentation and logic in the 90s. The argumentation logic employs
the procedural semantic which allows determining of the solutions of the argumenta-
tive disputes by identifying them with the definite extensions of the subsets of the
acceptable arguments on the argumentation framework. The argumentation frame-
work 𝐹 symbolizes a dispute 𝐹 = ⟨𝐴𝑟𝑔, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘⟩ in which 𝐴𝑟𝑔 is a set of arguments
𝐴𝑟𝑔 = {𝐴, 𝐵, … , 𝑋𝑛−1, 𝑋, …} and attack is a binary abstract relation modelling ob-
jection against a disputed conclusion: if 𝐴 objects 𝐵, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘[𝐴, 𝐵], then 𝐵 is rejected,
unless there is another argument 𝑋 such as 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘[𝑋, 𝐴] and 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘[𝑋, 𝐵] = ∅, which
reinstates 𝐵 (Dung 1995). An acceptable argument supports a conclusion for which
there is no acceptable argument supporting the contrary conclusion, such as 𝑋, or
which refutes the argument supporting the contrary conclusion, such as 𝐵.
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The credulous and skeptical algorithms of the procedural semantic propose two ways
of computing the subsets of the acceptable arguments (Лисанюк 2015). According to
the skeptical algorithm, the dispute consisting of 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘[𝐴, 𝐵] and 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘[𝐵, 𝐴], as in
Nixon diamond, the well-known example for illustrating default reasoning, results in
an empty extension, and in two stable extensions, 𝐴 and 𝐵, according to the credulous
algorithm. Informally, a skeptical reasoner gets convinced by a conclusion only if it is
supported by the arguments refuting the arguments in favor of the contrary conclusion.
For a credulous reasoner, any argument in favor of a conclusion is convictive, unless it
is refuted.
The extension semantic employs the concept of fixed point introduced by (Kripke
1975: 702), which in terms of the argumentation frameworks amounts to a pair of
arguments 𝜙, 𝜓 ∈ 𝐹 , 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘[𝜙, 𝜓] in relation to which any other argument 𝛾1, … , 𝛾𝑛 ∈
𝐹 is either acceptable or rejected, despite of the fact whether some of 𝛾1, … , 𝛾𝑛 are
attacked or not. The extension semantic of the argumentation logic allows viewing the
deep disagreements as the fixed points of a dispute, which divide its set of arguments
into the extension and anti-extension. Thus, after a skeptical reasoner adopts 𝜓, the
fixed point, she may claim ‘𝛾𝑖, since 𝜙’, but she cannot claim ‘𝛾𝑖, since 𝜓’, for 𝜓
is rejected by the attack. Suppose that 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘[𝜓, 𝜙], which turns 𝜓 and 𝜙 into the
extension and anti-extension. Now, adopting 𝜓 or 𝜙, but not both is available for
a credulous reasoner only, who is also free to adopt any of 𝛾1, … , 𝛾𝑛 and pick out
referring to 𝜓 or 𝜙 to justify that. Looking at the hinges as at the fixed points in the
extension semantic elaborates property (iii) of the deep disagreement and abstracts
from its properties (i), (ii) and (iv).
Let us sketch the advantages of viewing the deep disagreements as the fixed points,
or the hinges of the disputes. It preserves the local character of the disagreement, as
the computing the dispute resolutions by means of the extensions on the argumenta-
tion framework is dialog related. It allows employing the non-demonstrative persuasion
along with the demonstrative conviction, for on the argumentation frameworks argu-
ments are evaluated as acceptable or not irrelevantly of their logical structure. Since
the abstract argumentation approach treats arguments as unanalyzed elements of the
argumentation framework F, and to be the arguments it suffices that they are put
forward as objections or supports for some conclusions, their eligibility to function as
arguments is independent of them being atomic propositions or molecular arguments.
Although the conclusions defended in this way in the credulous or skeptical algorithm
can be called true in a wide sense, nevertheless the procedural truthfulness of them
differs from what logicians call true propositions in the denominative sense. It is one
of the reasons of why some analysts doubt that the abstract argumentation approach
belongs to the domain of logic (Prakken, Vreeswijk 2002); yet others suggest treating
that approach as a general view of defeasible inference and defining the deductive in-
ference as an indefeasible species of it (Kakas et al. 2018). Thus, looking at the hinges
as at the fixed points allowing pushing and pulling the knowledge door will turn the
Логико-философские штудии. ISSN 2223-3954 115
Elena Lisanyuk. Hinges, Deep Disagreement and Fixed Points in the Argumentation Logic
deep disagreements into results of those moves. Interpreting the hinges as the fixed
points in the abstract argumentation semantic algorithms corresponds to the third way
of understanding of what the hinges are, it generalizes treating them as propositions
or rules.
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